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different aspects of power and require different powers. Critical approaches to law tend 
to emphasise law’s closeness to singular, homogeneous power. But most statutes and 
legal procedures are concerned with plural powers: compartmentalised packets of 
delegated authority and duty conferred on and exercised by different legal actors (e.g. 
police officers, bailiffs, judges, etc.). 
All this makes the functioning of language in law harder to comprehend, partly 
because of the roles played by polysemy and vagueness in many of the keywords 
involved. Something of what order signifies, for example, that power does not, is a 
reconstruction of coercive power into a system of social regulation observing the rule 
of law (a principle subject to divergent interpretations but often functionally contrasted 
with the ‘rule of man’). 
Nor does the effect of different uses of keywords in law end with power and order. 
Introducing the idea of the ‘rule’ of law in fact extends the semantic task, because 
implementing the ‘rule of law’ will only involve ‘rules’ if rules are how law works (since 
rule, as a general social condition, may be exercised either by a ruler who issues 
commands or by one who follows rules). Rule and order can both denote states of affairs, 
or ‘systems’, or they can mean what people do to influence the actions of others (as 
those others carry out commands or comply with general instructions). It is almost 
impossible to extricate law’s relationship with power and order from conceptual 
problems inherent in the terminology involved. Yet beyond the questions of 
terminology, how power is exercised in language also depends on how, in practice, rules, 
commands and orders operate. 
REGULATION OF LANGUAGE USE A8 
In this unit, we switch to a different perspective on language and law: how language 
used in situations other than ‘legal’ contexts – in general communication – is treated 
if it becomes the subject matter of litigation. Examples of when this happens include 
cases of alleged bribery, harassment, trademark infringement, insulting or abusive 
verbal behaviour, defamation, and actions in a number of other fields. How language 
is treated in such circumstances differs from interpretation of statutes (where the 
language was drafted in anticipation of being read according to legal norms). It also 
differs from how oral or written evidence is treated in court (because the significance 
of evidential language lies primarily in what is reported rather than in effects on an 
addressee or other person of what is being expressed). In the ‘general language’ 
situations we now discuss, the main legal focus is on the meaning and effects of 
communication in the field of regulated public behaviour. 
Communications in trouble 
To begin, we outline the many ways in which verbal communication gets into trouble 
with the law, either by constituting criminal behaviour (i.e. where prosecution may 
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follow) or when disputed in a civil case (i.e. where one party, who alleges harm, sues 
another). We can clarify this range of uses of language, and why they are interesting, 
by listing the main types. Greenawalt (1989: 3) begins an analysis of the topic by asking 
an often-neglected question (which he argues is essential in clarifying the boundary of 
protected free speech): 
What is the ‘speech’ that is to be free and protected? Does it coincide with the category 
of verbal and written utterances, or is it possibly narrower or broader in some respects? 
As a route into this question, Greenawalt lists the main ways in which (under US 
law) a person may be guilty of a crime committed primarily or exclusively by 
communicating. His list (Greenawalt 1989: 6–7) is longer than the list below; our point 
here is less the detail than the range: 
1 Agrees with another to commit a crime.
 
2 Orders, requests or induces another to commit a crime.
 
3 Threatens harm unless another commits a crime.
 
4 Puts another in fear of imminent serious injury by physical menace.
 
5 Participates in a criminal endeavour by communicating (e.g. providing
 
information that makes the crime possible or conveying false information or 
advice). 
6 Warns a criminal how to escape from the police. 
7 Threatens harm if someone does not submit to sexual intercourse or perform some 
other act he or she is free not to perform. 
8 Offers to bribe someone or offers to receive a bribe for the performance of an act 
that should be performed, if at all, free of such inducement. 
9 Successfully encourages someone to commit suicide. 
10 Entices a child from custody. 
11 Uses provocative or insulting language likely to cause angered listeners to commit 
crimes. 
12 Engages in speech likely to lead those persuaded by its message to commit crimes. 
13 Makes a false public alarm (e.g. the widely discussed example of falsely shouting 
‘Fire!’ in a crowded theatre). 
14 Acquires property or some other material advantage by deception. 
15 Pretends to hold a position in public service with the aim of getting someone else 
to submit to pretended authority. 
16 Uses language or representations that are insulting or offensive. 
A second list can be produced of ways a person’s communications may give rise to 
civil proceedings. A full list of this kind would be more diffuse and complicated than 
Greenawalt’s, but might begin with categories based on topics in media and intellectual 
property: 
17	 Publishes a defamatory statement (i.e. a false statement likely to lower someone 
it refers to in the estimation of others, or cause them to be avoided or shunned). 
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18 Publishes or broadcasts an advert that contains false and disparaging comments 
about a commercial rival. 
19 Engages in commercial activity using a verbal trademark sign that is identical to 
or resembles an already registered mark currently in use for the same class of goods 
or services. 
20 Posts online a parody caricaturing the opinions and mannerisms of a celebrity, so 
precisely conceived and drafted that it appears to be a genuine post by the celebrity 
himself or herself. 
A list of this kind would be extensive, reflecting the complexity of legal causes of 
action as much as different kinds of verbal action. A third list might also be produced, 
of kinds of utterance or text that fail to satisfy standards prescribed by extrajudicial 
regulatory codes (e.g. codes used to govern press, broadcasting and advertising 
standards); and further lists again could be compiled of communicative acts restricted 
by rules stated in institutional speech codes (e.g. corporate or campus speech codes). 
In legal terms, the lists would relate and overlap in various ways. 
Linguistically, the categories of discourse behaviour listed above cut across channels, 
situations of use, topics or areas of social activity, genres, and types of communicator 
(the last of these including people engaged in conversation, social media posters, 
tweeters and bloggers, government, national broadcasters, and the communications 
divisions of multinational corporations). There is nevertheless a shared question in 
disputes related to all of them: what is the meaning of the allegedly offending or 
infringing utterance? Only when that meaning is determined can the law or relevant 
regulation be applied. 
The meaning and effect of ordinary discourse 
There is no reason in principle why laws and regulations should not be applied to 
communicative acts in the same way that findings of fact are made concerning other 
areas of human behaviour. In practice, however, being certain of the meaning or effect 
of a disputed communication is made more difficult by the exceptionally complex and 
nuanced character of language: its ability to talk about past, present and future events, 
as well as about hypothetical worlds and situations that didn’t happen; its ability to 
convey meanings indirectly, saying one thing but implying another; and its capability 
to perform one kind of speech act (e.g. a question) in order to perform a different act 
(e.g. a request or apology). Much of the complexity in communicative behaviour results 
from our capability to imply something more or different in what we say by anticipating 
that the recipient will make relevant inferences. 
In content adjudication (as proceedings related to the kinds of dispute above are 
known), meaning must often be inferred rather than taken from the words at face value. 
A standard textbook example in defamation law states, for instance, that while ‘Mr X 
went into 158 River Street’ is not in itself defamatory, it becomes defamatory if the 
relevant readership would be aware that the address in question is a brothel (for an 
introductory account, see Quinn 2011; for a fuller discussion, see Barendt et al. 2014). 
Defamation law, as we see in Unit B8, has developed sophisticated procedures for 
dealing with such implied meanings. 
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The issue of directly stated versus implied meanings also arises in other fields of 
law. In verbal exchanges during courtroom proceedings, whether someone commits 
perjury, or lying under oath, may depend on implication as much as explicitly expressed 
statement. President Clinton’s famous denial during Grand Jury hearings in 1998 that 
he had ‘sexual relations’ with Monica Lewinsky appears more like a lie if the context 
and purpose of the question he was responding to are taken into account, rather than 
when interpretation of his answer is restricted to the phrase meaning of sexual relations 
(Solan and Tiersma 2005: 224). Writers including Tiersma (1989) have emphasised 
the importance of including implied meanings alongside literal meaning in interpreting 
courtroom answers. 
Key questions in a number of otherwise largely unrelated areas of law concern how 
implied meanings can be precisely described, and how likely any particular indirect 
meaning is. Neither task is easy. Care must also be taken with utterance effect. One 
common challenge faced by courts, for example, is what speech act a given utterance 
is performing (Schane 2006). Some speech acts, as we have seen (e.g. conspiring, 
bribing, inviting a bribe, threatening), constitute crimes. But while often such acts may 
take an explicit performative form, in many cases they are more likely to be expressed 
indirectly. As Greenawalt himself notes throughout his study, borderline cases of 
protected speech are often created where indirectness is introduced into communi ­
cations that might in explicit form be criminal speech acts. Indirectness creates the 
appearance of a statement or opinion that merits at least some minimal level of 
protection. Given the importance and complexity of indirect speech acts in sensitive 
areas, it is unsurprising that in jurisdictions hospitable to expert linguistic evidence, 
speech act analysis has been deployed to examine what constitutes a felicitous (or 
successful) speech act of a particular kind, whether performed explicitly or indirectly. 
Bribery, for example, has been argued to consist of a structure involving several moves, 
each of which may be realised in largely predictable ways: problem, proposal, 
completion and extension (Shuy 1993: 20–65). 
Protected and unprotected speech 
The central question prompting Greenawalt’s enquiry into different uses of language 
concerned why some communications clearly merit and others do not merit protection 
as free speech, while some communications raise problems at the borderline (e.g. a 
ranting ‘political’ diatribe that stirs up angry and potentially vengeful feelings in its 
audience). Closer analysis should make it possible, Greenawalt claimed, to illuminate 
this question by relating it to the characteristics of different kinds of utterance. 
The generic term Greenawalt uses for communication is speech. This is one of two 
conventional terms (the other being expression) used in discussions of the role of 
communication in democratic social structures. Speech, in this sense, is not in contrast 
with writing, but (as we note in Unit B1) with action or conduct. Varieties of such 
speech may be distinguished by a combination of topic (political, commercial, personal, 
etc.) and purpose (to convey new ideas, to discuss or critique other people’s ideas or 
values, to expose, amuse, titillate or gossip, etc.). Different forms of speech, in this 
specialised meaning, may then be treated as meriting different degrees of protection 
on the strength of the contribution they make to the democratic and liberal political 
values on which the principle of freedom of expression, or ‘protected speech’, is 
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based. Expression, often used almost interchangeably with speech, also means 
communication in general. In European law, it explicitly covers receiving as well as 
imparting information: Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), for example, states that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’. (For 
compre hensive discussion of the concept of freedom of expression, as well as how it 
is constructed in different legal systems, see Barendt (2005).) 
Ultimately, Greenawalt’s concern with communicative acts is legal rather than 
linguistic. The borderline between speech and conduct is important in his analysis 
because it is where many difficult legal questions arise in US First Amendment 
jurisprudence (where balancing is undertaken between the constitutional benefit of the 
speech and the harms to which it might give rise, with a presumption in favour of 
expression). The same is true in Europe, where free speech rights allow necessary and 
proportionate restriction on expression (as listed in ECHR Art 10(2)). Linguistically, 
however, what is interesting in Greenawalt’s analysis is a central insight: that virtually 
all the kinds of communication whose restriction seems not to raise free speech issues 
are what he calls ‘situation-altering utterances’. 
Influenced by the work of Austin and Searle (see Thread 7), Greenawalt offers a 
generalisation based on speech act types and the expression value accorded to them legally. 
But he avoids a simplification that might have followed from simplistic contrast between 
performative and constative utterances. A contrast of that kind, Greenawalt recognises, 
would suggest that Austin’s abandoned category of constatives (which state facts, 
describe states of affairs or articulate thoughts) convey ideas and are therefore candidates 
for legal protection, while ‘performatives’ are social actions for which language is simply 
a vehicle, and so should be treated as actions, not ‘speech’. Even a simplified contrast of 
that kind, Greenawalt points out, helps to clarify the celebrated US judge Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s explanation, in a US Supreme Court judg ment, of why falsely 
shouting ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theatre brings responsibility for the false warning and enjoys 
no free speech protection. But it leaves the problem of indirectly expressed meanings that 
create the borderline cases in terms of constitutional protection. 
The distinctions Greenawalt advances on the basis of his analysis of speech acts 
help to illuminate a central doctrine of US First Amendment thinking: that there is 
an important boundary between communications that add to a socially valuable 
marketplace of ideas by their expression or critique of ideas and values, no matter 
how unpalatable, and communications that are primarily kinds of conduct: acts of 
harassment, first moves in a fight, verbal actions of subordination, and subjugation or 
intimidation of others. That boundary has been repeatedly tested and examined 
through concepts including fighting words (as kinds of provocation, or inchoate 
action) and speech plus (communications embedded in threatening behaviour or 
incitement; for detailed history and discussion, see Kalven 1988). In a later work, 
Greenawalt (1995) examines how similarly difficult issues arise in hate speech; in that 
context, the concept and implications of ‘performative’ utterances – principally that, 
as actions, performatives may be regulated without interfering with free speech values 
– have been significantly, and controversially, extended by MacKinnon (1993) in 
relation to pornography, and more broadly in Butler (1997). 
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Language and freedom of expression 
The concept of free speech or freedom of expression is, in the end, a political or 
philosophical topic more than a linguistic one (for a short introduction, see Warburton 
2009). That topic, however, is central to understanding how language functions – and 
what its value is – in modern democratic societies. Where the boundaries lie between 
protected and unprotected speech depends on analyses that depend on linguistic 
assessments, whether the distinctions made are formulated in terms familiar in 
linguistics or in an alternative, separately developed legal metalanguage. 
Freedom of expression has become particularly controversial over the last two 
decades, not only because of obvious political examples of its curtailment. The concept 
is crucial in understanding new forms of language behaviour on the Internet, especially 
given widespread misapprehension that language use online is not regulated in the way 
that face-to-face interaction, print publication, broadcasting or film exhibition all are. 
Online verbal communication poses major challenges to regulation, including at least 
the following: 
❏	 New kinds of speech event are being created, blending formats of one-to-one 
dialogue, centre–periphery publication, variable participant and overhearer 
groupings (McQuail and Windahl 1993). 
❏	 Current and archived discourse are accessible together to an unprecedented degree, 
flattening different historical contexts into a continuous present. 
❏	 Communicators and recipients may have vastly different belief systems and 
background knowledge, challenging face-to-face notions of mutual background 
knowledge. 
❏	 Communicators and recipients are often located in different legal systems, with 
sometimes very different norms and restrictions regarding what can and cannot, 
or should or should not, be communicated. 
A9 FORENSIC EVIDENCE 
This unit describes how linguistic knowledge can in some circumstances contribute to 
the functioning of law through an applied channel: that of forensic linguistics. There 
are two main ways this happens. First, linguistic evidence is sometimes presented in 
particular cases, assisting the police, courts and regulatory bodies. Second, analysis of 
language use in the legal system and insights that follow from it can help to improve 
access to justice. In this unit, we illustrate the variety of linguistic work that takes place 
under the heading forensic linguistics. In Unit B9, we exemplify techniques involved 
in forensic linguistic analysis in several fields. Our overall aim is to show how expertise 
has been brought to bear by forensic linguists on evidential questions. In doing so, we 
also note difficulties associated with use of specialist linguistic evidence in law. 
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